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ABSTRACT
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has often been hailed as
an engine of European integration. Entrusted with the task of securing the uniform interpretation of the law of the European Union—
among other functions—the ECJ makes use of comparative law for
a variety of purposes. The very composition of the Court and its peculiar linguistic regime make the Court a major comparative law
laboratory. Under the Treaties, the Court is explicitly authorised to
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resort to comparative law as a method of judicial interpretation with
regard to certain aspects of European law. But comparative law is
an essential tool for the Court in several other contexts as well. This
article is the occasion to take a closer look at the role that comparative law plays in the development of the jurisprudence of the Court,
and to showcase some salient applications of it. Quite often, the
Court limits references to comparative law arguments to a few lines
in its judgments. Nonetheless, comparisons that go far beyond the
merely technical aspects of the law are part and parcel of the everyday business of the Court. Even when the language of comparative
law is not overtly spoken, those comparisons define the ethos of the
European Union, and show how the Union sets out to challenge, and
change, the laws of the Member States.
Keywords: comparative law, European law, legal harmonization, legal translation, general principles of law, autonomous concepts,
constitutional traditions, constitutional identity, European Court of
Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
The European Court of Justice, known as the ECJ, is entrusted
with the task of securing the uniform interpretation and application
of the law of the European Union (EU). 1 To achieve its mandate, the
ECJ often draws on the methodologies of comparative law to interpret the law of the EU. I intend to showcase aspects of this practice
and highlight how it has been fundamental to the growth of European law. The ECJ is now part of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which is comprised of the ECJ and the General Court.
The General Court is a specialised Court of more limited jurisdiction. The ECJ remains the dominant forum for the most important
part of the judicial business of the Union. In this paper, I will therefore mostly focus on the ECJ as a consumer of comparative law.

1. Article 19 Treaty on European Union [hereinafter TEU].
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There is an abundance of literature on the various uses of comparative law by constitutional and supreme courts around the
world. 2 This literature analyses citation patterns and practices and
mutual influences, but also poses a good number of critical questions concerning the use of comparative law by courts. A basic question is whether comparative law references are relevant at all in deciding a case pending before a national court. What are these
2. To mention works published in the last twenty years only, see, e.g., THE
USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW BY COURTS, XIVTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF
COMPARATIVE LAW, ATHENS 1997 (U. Drobnig & S. van Erp eds., Kluwer 1999);
B. Markesinis & J. Fedtke, The Judge as Comparatist, 80 TUL. L. REV. 11 (2005);
G. F. FERRARI & A. GAMBARO, CORTI NAZIONALI E COMPARAZIONE GIURIDICA
(E.S.I. 2006); B. S. MARKESINIS, J. FEDTKE & L. ACKERMANN, JUDICIAL
RECOURSE TO FOREIGN LAW: A NEW SOURCE OF INSPIRATION? (UCL Press
2006); B. S. MARKESINIS & J. FEDTKE, ENGAGING WITH FOREIGN LAW (Hart
Publ’g 2009); T. H. BINGHAM, WIDENING HORIZONS: THE INFLUENCE OF
COMPARATIVE LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ON DOMESTIC LAW (Cambridge
U. Press 2010); G. Smorto, L’uso giurisprudenziale della comparazione, EUROPA
E DIRITTO PRIVATO 223 (2010); V. BARSOTTI & V. VARANO, 1 IL NUOVO RUOLO
DELLE CORTI SUPREME NELL’ORDINE POLITICO E ISTITUZIONALEDIALOGO DI
DIRITTO COMPARATO (Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane 2012); M. BOBEK,
COMPARATIVE REASONING IN EUROPEAN SUPREME COURTS (Oxford U. Press
2013); M. Gelter & M. M. Siems, Language, Legal Origins, and Culture Before
the Courts: Cross-Citations Between Supreme Courts in Europe, 21 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. 215 (2013); 1 THE USE OF FOREIGN PRECEDENTS BY
CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGES (T. Groppi & M-C. Ponthoreau eds., Hart Publ’g 2013);
E. MAK, JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING IN A GLOBALISED WORLD: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CHANGING PRACTICES OF WESTERN HIGHEST
COURTS (Hart Publ’g 2013); M. Gelter & M.M. Siems, Citations to Foreign
Courts—Illegitimate and Superfluous, or Unavoidable? Evidence from Europe,
62 AM. J. COMP. LAW 35, 35–86 (2014); R. HIRSCHL, COMPARATIVE MATTERS:
THE RENAISSANCE OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Oxford U. Press
2014); COURTS AND COMPARATIVE LAW (M. Andenas & D. Fairgrieve eds., Oxford U. Press 2015); A. von Bogdandy, Comparative Constitutional Law as a Social Science? A Hegelian Reaction to Ran Hirschl’s Comparative Matters, 55 DER
STAAT 103–115 (2016), available at https://perma.cc/3CX3-NMTB; D. S. Law,
Judicial Comparativism and Judicial Diplomacy, 168 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA L.
REV. 927 (2015); R. Hirschl, Judicial Review and the Politics of Comparative
Citations: Theory, Evidence & Methodological Challenges, in COMPARATIVE
JUDICIAL REVIEW (E.F. Delaney & R. Dixon eds., Edward Elgar 2018); JUDICIAL
COSMOPOLITANISM: THE USE OF FOREIGN LAW IN CONTEMPORARY
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS (G. F. Ferrari ed., Brill Nijhoff 2019); C. Lienen, Judicial Constitutional Comparativism at the UK Supreme Court, 39 LEG. STUD.
166 (2018). The literature on judicial dialogue, judicial globalization, community
of courts, or transnational organizational field of courts, provides further insights
on the trends mapped by this literature. For the historical perspective, see G.
Gorla, Il ricorso alla legge di un “luogo vicino” nell’ambito del diritto comune
europeo, 89 FORO IT. (1973).
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references? A mere puffery by learned jurists, an embellishment of
national laws, the mark of a desperate litigator? What else could they
be? Another question often posed is to what degree are comparative
law arguments made by the courts legitimate? Do they simply fall
outside the purview of the judge because they go beyond the local,
applicable law? Are they legitimate, if examined under the broad
rule of law criteria? In some judgments of the U.S. Supreme Court
these questions emerge and are also addressed by some members of
that Court in their extrajudicial writings. 3 Personally, I had the
pleasure of listening to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg on these very
issues. The occasion was the World Congress of Comparative Law
held in Washington, D.C. by the International Academy of Comparative law in 2010. 4 It was a fascinating lecture, which defended the
use of comparative law in constitutional adjudication. Closer to
home, the Italian Constitutional Court has increasingly paid attention to comparative law as a subject that is relevant in various ways
to the decision of constitutional law cases. 5 A former Italian Constitutional Court Judge, Prof. Sabino Cassese, pointed to the fact that
in the late twentieth century the increased relevance of comparative
law in this context has been favoured by the demise of the ideology
3. S. A. Simon, The Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional
Rights Cases: an Empirical Study, 1 J. L. CTS. 279 (2013); R.C. Black, R. J. Owens & J. L. Brookhart, We Are the World: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign Sources of Law, 46 BRITISH J. POLITICAL SCI. 891 (2014); G. F. Ferrari, Legal
Comparison Within the Case Law of the Supreme Court of the United States of
America, in JUDICIAL COSMOPOLITANISM 94 (Brill Nijhoff 2019).
4. The speech was delivered on July 30, 2010. It is now reported on the web
site of the Supreme Court of the United States, available at https://perma.cc/68QJXJVV. An extended version of the speech was delivered on previous occasions;
see., e.g., R. Bader Ginsburg, A Decent Respect to the Opinions of Humankind:
The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 64
CAMBRIDGE L. J. 575 (2005).
5. For a recent assessment, see P. Passaglia, Corte costituzionale e comparazione giuridica: una analisi (molto) sineddotica, una conclusione (quasi) sinestesia, in 12 I RAPPORTI CIVILISTICI NELL’INTERPRETAZIONE DELLA CORTE
COSTITUZIONALE NEL DECENNIO 2006–2016, 12° CONVEGNO NAZIONALE DELLA
SOCIETÀ ITALIANA DEGLI STUDIOSI DEL DIRITTO CIVILE (E.S.I 2018). The offices
of the Court have produced a document that reflects on this use as well; see R.
Nevola, Corte Costituzionale: Servizio Studi, L’assistenza alla decisione giurisdizionale (Oct. 2018), available at https://perma.cc/H5S6-EHN9.
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of nationalism, and by the spreading of the awareness that common
problems may yield common solutions, elaborated beyond the nation state, at the international level. 6
The literature that I have just mentioned is hardly relevant to approach the use of comparative law by the European Court of Justice,
however. The use of comparative law reasoning by the ECJ must be
understood holistically, in the light of the institutional position of
the Court and the nature of EU law. Far from being contested, recourse to the use of comparative law by the ECJ is widely accepted.
The legitimacy of recourse to comparative law in the interpretation
or application of European law derives, in specific instances, from
the texts of the Treaties that are the bulwark of the EU’s very existence, as it will be seen. But, beyond those specific cases, comparative law is widely accepted (and practiced) by all the players in the
game: members of the Court, litigants, and academic commentators
on EU law by and large share the same support for the legitimacy of
comparative law in the judicial practice of the ECJ. Eminent members of the Court—including its current President, Koen Lenaerts—
writing in their extrajudicial capacity signal the substantial role that
comparative law plays in the jurisprudence of the Court. 7 I will
6. S. Cassese, Sulla diffusione nel mondo della giustizia costituzionaleNuovi paradigmi per la comparazione giuridica, 4 RIV. TRIM. DIR. PUB. 993
(2016).
7. F.G. Jacobs, Comparative Law and European Union Law, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 525 (2d. ed., M. Reimann & R. Zimmermann
eds, Oxford U. Press 2019) [hereinafter OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE
LAW]; K. Lenaerts, The European Court of Justice and the Comparative Law
Method, 25 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 297 (2017); K. Lenaerts, The Comparative Law
Method and the European Court of Justice: Echoes Across the Atlantic, 64 AM.
J. COMP. L. 841 (2016); K. Lenaerts, La Cour de Justice de l’Union européenne
et la méthode comparative, in LE DROIT COMPARÉ AU XXIE SIÈCLE—ENJEUX ET
DÉFIS 35 (B. Fauvarque-Cosson ed. 2015). For previous extra judicial writings by
members of the Court on its use of comparative law methods, see P. Mengozzi,
Les principes fondamentaux du droit communautaire et les droits des États
membres, 3 RDUE 435 (2002); W. Van Gerven, Comparative Law in a Texture
of Communitarization of National Laws and Europeanization of Community Law,
in JUDICIAL REVIEW IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVELIBER AMICORUM IN
HONOUR OF LORD SLYNN OF HADLEY 433 (Kluwer 2000); C. N. Kakouris, Use of
the Comparative Method by the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 6
PACE INT’L L. REV. 267 (1994); J. Mertens de Wilmars, Le droit comparé dans la
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therefore discuss the overall practice of comparative law by the
Court, while highlighting some of its specific features. I will then
formulate a few observations concerning this practice, to better understand what the Court is comparing when it goes about the business of rendering its rulings.
II. MULTILINGUALISM, TRANSLATION, AND INTERPRETATION AT THE
ECJ
A preliminary point to consider is the specific linguistic regime
governing litigation at the ECJ in Luxembourg. This regime mirrors
the institutional position of a supranational court that belongs to an
integrated multilingual European legal order. The twenty-eight
judges of the Court, one for each Member State, and the eleven Advocates General of the Court, are called upon to work as well in a
multilingual environment. The European Union’s linguistic regime
requires the publication of EU law in all the twenty-four official languages of the Member States, bar one, Irish, that, for resource-related reasons, is not as well served. 8 The specific linguistic arrangements governing the procedure of the ECJ need not be presented in
detail here, 9 but they surely involve a huge translation and interpretation effort. In the preliminary ruling procedure, used by the
jurisprudence de la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes, JOURNAL DES
TRIBUNAUX 37 (1991); Y. Galmot, Réflexions sur le recours au droit comparé
par la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes, 6 RFDA 255 (1990); P.
Pescatore, Le recours, dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes, à des normes déduites de la comparaison des droits des États
membres, 32 R.I.D.C. 337 (1980) (with citations to prior contributions on the
same topic); for the opinion of a former member of the Commission’s legal services, see M. Hilf, The Role of Comparative Law in the Jurisprudence of the Court
of Justice of the European Communities, in THE LIMITATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 558 (Yvon Blais 1986).
8. Council Regulation (EC) No 920/2005 of June 13, 2005, amending Regulation No 1 of April 15, 1958 determining the language to be used by the European Economic Community and Regulation No 1 of April 15, 1958 determining
the language to be used by the European Atomic Energy Community and introducing temporary derogation measures from those Regulations.
9. For a short explanation of the applicable rules, see Court of Justice of the
European Union, Language arrangements at the Court of Justice of the European
Union, https://perma.cc/X9H6-FVMD.
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national courts to refer questions relating to the interpretation of the
EU to the ECJ, the language of the questions posed to the ECJ determines the language of the case. The preliminary questions formulated by the local court must then be immediately translated in all
the other official languages of the Union for their publication in the
Official Journal of the European Union. The deliberations and the
internal communications of the Court are all in French, which was
the language of choice when the Court was established in 1958.
French is also the language of the draft judgments deliberated by the
Court and of the final judgment. Once more, however, the judgment
has to be translated in the language of the original procedure—the
language considered authentic—and then in all the official languages of the Union. By itself, this demanding linguistic regime involves considerable comparative law skills. To provide reliable, accurate renderings of meaning across all these languages is a formidable task. One commentator who closely observed the workings of
the institution noticed that: “the role of translation at the CJEU goes
deeper than ‘simply’ converting judgments from the working language of that Court into the other twenty-three EU official languages. Translation is, in fact, embedded in the process of drafting,
reasoning and deciding a case before the CJEU.” 10 Consider, for example, the case of Webb v. Webb. 11 This litigation raised a question
of jurisdiction over an immovable property located in France that
was subject to an English resulting trust. The question referred to
the Court required the European judge to be familiar with notions
such as legal ownership, beneficial interest, presumption of advancement, and the nature of a resulting trust. To translate these
terms into languages other than English, where the trust may be a
10. K. McAuliffe, Translating Ambiguity, 9 J. COMP. L. 65, 66 (2015). For
an insider’s view of the process that is involved in the drafting of a judgment, see
K. McAuliffe, Behind the Scenes at the Court of Justice, in EU LAW STORIES:
CONTEXTUAL AND CRITICAL HISTORIES OF EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENCE 35 (B. Davies & F. Nicola eds., Cambridge U. Press 2017) [hereinafter EU LAW STORIES].
11. C-294/92 George Lawrence Webb v Lawrence Desmond Webb [1994]
ECR, I-01717.
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relatively new or even non-existent concept, surely requires comparative law skills. A similar difficulty may arise with purely civilian notions, of course. For instance, can a usufruct over immovable
property be compared to the concept of “leasing or letting of immovable property” for tax purposes? In giving a positive answer to
this question, Advocate General Francis Jacobs provided an extensive comparative examination of the legal regimes of Europe in relation to time limited rights over immovable property. 12 This is a
wonderful example of functional comparative law. It must have also
been a formidable challenge for the lawyer-linguists who translated
this opinion into all the other official languages of the Union. 13 To
facilitate the tasks of the 606 lawyer-linguists employed at the
Court, 14 there is a terminology coordination unit that handles the
management of (comparative) multilingual legal terminology. This
unit defines and coordinates the terminological projects that contribute to the overall quality of the texts; among its tasks there is the
terminological and legal pre-processing of the documents to be
translated. 15
III. COMPARATIVE LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR SHARED MEANING IN
EUROPEAN LAW
As discussed in the next pages, recourse to comparative law in
the interpretation and application of EU law is expressly warranted
12. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs delivered on Feb. 22, 2001, Case C326/99 Stichting “Goed Wonen” v Staatssecretaris van Financiën [2001] ECR I06831.
13. On the role of Court’s lawyer-linguists, see K. McAuliffe, Hidden Translators: The Invisibility of Translators and the Influence of Lawyer-Linguists on
the Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, 3 LANGUAGE AND
LAW/LINGUAGEM E DIREITO 3, 5 (2016). McAuliffe notes that the grounding of
jurisprudence in the historical French, as dictated by the Court, secures the stable
meaning of the terms of art. However, this at times leaves even native French
speakers struggling with the interpretation of their own language.
14. COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Annual report−The Year in
Review 19 (2018).
15. For more information on this unit, see Court of Justice of the European
Union, Projects and Terminological Coordination Unit, https://perma.cc/867XZ7DV.
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by the Treaties in some cases. 16 Beyond those cases, the Court also
has recourse to comparative law even when it is not expressly sanctioned by the Treaties. The uniform interpretation and application of
EU law throughout the Union requires the establishment of a uniform meaning of the law across the Union’s languages. This meaning may be established in clear terms by the European texts, which
often provide the relevant definitions and notions. But this is not
always the case, and therefore the Court must decide whether, absent
a clear indication by those texts, a certain term or expression shall
nonetheless have a uniform meaning across the Union, or not. Sometimes the laws of many jurisdictions may converge on a single answer to this question, by providing a shared meaning for a certain
term or expression, but this is seldom the case. When the laws of the
Member States go in different directions, comparative law helps the
Court establish the level of uniformity or divergence that is achieved
or should be achieved by EU law on a certain point. To cater to the
relevant research and documentation needs, the Court has in place
tailored support resources. The Court may thus turn to the services
of its Research and Documentation Directorate to acquire a comparative law report on any question that merits an analysis. Sadly, these
reports are still not accessible to the public and to researchers. And,
in this respect at least, comparative law operates behind the scenes
in the workings of the European judiciary.
How does the Court proceed to resolve conflicting interpretations of EU law between the Member States? Here is a simple, illustrative example, provided by a famous package travel case. 17 A girl
went on holiday with her parents in Turkey. At the club where they
spent their vacation, she got food poisoning. After her return to Austria, she claimed damages for pain and suffering and, most importantly, for her spoiled holiday. The defendant was a German
travel agency. Vacation packages in Europe were then governed by
16. See infra Parts VII, VIII.
17. Case C-168/00 Simone Leitner v TUI Deutschland GmbH & Co. KG
[2002] ECR I-02631.
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Council Directive 90/314/EEC (Directive 90/314), implemented by
all the Member States. 18 But how does the concept of “damages”
play out in EU law under this directive was unclear. The Austrian
Court that had jurisdiction over the case rejected the claim for the
loss of enjoyment of the holiday. Under Austrian law, this type of
non-material loss was not a compensable loss. On appeal, the Court
formulated a request for a preliminary ruling by the ECJ. The question referred to the ECJ concerned the concept of “damages” under
the applicable package travel directive. Can damages include compensation for the non-material damage suffered by the unlucky
young tourist? Without a clear answer in the directive, was the Austrian Court right to simply apply its own law concerning what damage is recoverable in similar circumstances? Or does the Directive
require an autonomous notion of “damages” for the purpose of giving effect to its provisions?
In addressing this issue, the ECJ had before itself a variety of
solutions prevailing in the laws of Member States: some favouring
compensation for the non-material damages, others rejecting it. Advocate General Tizzano, presenting this picture to the Court, spotted
a trend prevailing across the Member State favouring the reparation
of the non-pecuniary damage for spoiled holidays. 19 Furthermore, to
rule out a uniform approach to those losses would have frustrated
one of the purposes of Directive 90/314, namely the securing of

18. Council Directive 90/314/EEC of June 13, 1990 on package travel, package holidays and package tours, OJ L 158, 23.6.1990, p. 59–64. The Directive has
been replaced by a new instrument, which is force since 2018; see Directive (EU)
2015/2302 of the European Parliament and of the Council of Nov. 25, 2015 on
package travel and linked travel arrangements, amending Regulation (EC) No
2006/2004 and Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council and repealing Council Directive 90/314/EEC, OJ L 325, 11.12.2015, p.
1–33. The recitals of the new Directive now make clear that damages for spoiled
holidays under the Directive shall: “cover non-material damage, such as compensation for loss of enjoyment of the trip or holiday because of substantial problems
in the performance of the relevant travel services.”
19. Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano delivered on Sept. 20, 2001, Case
C-168/00 Simone Leitner v TUI Deutschland GmbH & Co. KG [2002] ECR I02631.
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undistorted competition in the functioning of the internal market. 20
Following the Advocate General’s opinion, the Court thus held that
compensation of the non-pecuniary damage asked by the claimant
for the non-performance of touristic services should have been allowed, if such damages were proven before the national court. 21
IV. THE KEYWORDS, THE CONCEPTS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES
This brings me to highlight two points. First, the methodology
to research key sources, namely the case law corpus of the EJC,
which can give us a fuller picture of the use of comparative law by
the Court. A textual search in the European case law database EurLex to find documents containing the words “comparative law”
would have missed the package travel case I have just mentioned.
How can this be? The keyword “comparative” is absent from the
judgment; the search string “comparative law” is not found in the
Advocate General’s opinion too, because he uses the expression
“comparative analysis” instead. If my tentative count is correct, no
more than ten court judgments contain a textual reference to “comparative law.” Indeed, this is a rare textual occurrence. The Advocate Generals’ opinions present a more encouraging picture. A first
tentative count produces 108 opinions containing the search string
“comparative law.” But, as mentioned above, these numbers cannot
be considered reliable if we intend to go into the substance of the
matter. Let there be no doubt about this: a deeper investigation
would turn out different numbers. How different? This is difficult to
say. No study has systematically addressed this precise question so
far. In other words, this is a latent reservoir of comparative law exercises that has yet to be tapped for research purposes.
Let me now turn to the second point mentioned above, which
concerns the nature of the exercise in which the Court is involved
when deciding similar cases. By securing the uniform interpretation
20. Id. at ¶ 44.
21. Case C-168/00.
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and application of EU law across Europe, the Court reduces the discretion that is otherwise left to the Member States, as it did in the
package travel case discussed above. There can be no uniform interpretation of EU law if the Member States were to enjoy a high degree of discretion, as it happens when the Treaties allow for this diversity, because a certain matter is not attributed to the competence
of the Union, or because the Union has not legislated to introduce
such uniformity, even though it would have been competent to do
so. Nonetheless, when the Court elaborates the autonomous concepts that are needed to establish the uniformity that is required, the
Court often consults the laws of the Member States, and draws from
them, thus avoiding a top down approach to the interpretation of EU
law. Why does this happen?
It is true that the legal order established by the Treaties is autonomous from the laws of the Member States. 22 This is a constitutional
feature of EU law. Yet, despite this, the legal order established by
the Union is also incomplete in many respects, precisely because it
is a new legal order. To put it quite bluntly and in common sense
language: in many respects EU law has more holes than a well-aged
piece of Swiss cheese. As Luigi Moccia wrote, this reflects an underlying structure in which “being a European lawyer,” “means to
be able to be a bridge for communication and the opening of its national (domestic) legal system with other member states’ legal systems and with the Union’s legal system itself, through the development on a comparative basis of a new European ius commune.” 23
22. Case 26-62 NV Algemene Transport en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend
& Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration [1963] ECR, English special edition, 00001; Case 6–64 Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L. [1964] ECR, English
special edition, 00585.
23. L. Moccia, Dalla comparazione alla integrazione giuridica: la via della
cittadinanza europea, 2 LA CITTADINANZA EUROPEA 5 (2015). Moccia’s following works have explored in depth these dimensions of the European order, both
from the historical and the current prespective, see L. Moccia, Prospetto storico
delle origini e degli atteggiamenti del moderno diritto comparato. (Per una teoria
dell’ordinamento giuridico “aperto”), RIV. TRIM. DIR. PROC. CIV 181 (1996); L.
Moccia, Diritto europeo, ordinamento aperto e formazione giuridica, 1 LA
CITTADINANZA EUROPEA 31 (2012); L. Moccia, Cittadinanza dell’Unione e
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The European Treaties established that the Court must secure the
uniform interpretation and application of the law, thus establishing
the principle of legality as the Union’s cornerstone. 24 But the Treaty
itself does not provide a full account of the substantive principles
underlying EU law. It also does not provide for the applicable standard of review. 25 This is why in the last two decades or so, with respect to core areas of private law, a legion of European jurists strived
to provide a text that would eventually help to fill many of the gaps,
by providing an overall frame of reference for those areas. 26 The
search for a full set of principles, concepts, and rules covering certain private law matters was driven by the desire to overcome the
piece-meal approach of EU law to contract, torts, delictual liability,
obligations, and so on. Whether the EU had the competence to enact
such a wide-ranging text was a foundational constitutional question, 27 which was often postponed in the debates over this proposal.
In the end, the Union decided not to go forward, for disparate reasons, which need not be investigated here. But the challenge posed
by this state of affairs remains open 28 and the many lessons linked
formazione di un diritto e di un giurista europeo, European Rights (2013), at
https://perma.cc/3RPF-TNZY. In the field of constitutional law, this is the approach strongly advocated by A. Von Bogdandy, The Past and Promise of Doctrinal Constructivism: A Strategy for Responding to the Challenges Facing Constitutional Scholarship in Europe. 7 INT’L J. CONST. L. 364 (2009), and by the
scholars who worked with him to the books published in the series Handbuch Ius
Publicum Europaeum.
24. Article 19.1 TEU: “The Court of Justice of the European Union shall . . .
ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed.” See also articles 251 et seq. Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union.
25. T. TRIDIMAS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW 20 (Oxford U. Press
2006); T. Koopmans, The Birth of European Law at the Crossroad of Legal traditions, 39 AM. J. COMP. LAW 493, 493–495 (1991). With regard to private law,
see N. REICH, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU CIVIL LAW (Intersentia 2014).
26. C. TWIGG-FLESNER, THE EUROPEANISATION OF CONTRACT LAW:
CURRENT CONTROVERSIES IN LAW (2d., Routledge 2013).
27. See, e.g., S.R. Weatherill, European Private Law and the Constitutional
Dimension, in THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE
LAWCOLLECTED COURSES OF THE ACADEMY OF EUROPEAN LAW (F. Cafaggi
ed., Oxford U. Press 2006).
28. See, e.g., COMMENTARIES ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAWS (N. Jansen &
R. Zimmermann eds., Oxford U. Press 2018). The books in the Common Core of
European Private Law series with General Editors Ugo Mattei and Mauro
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to this failure must still be fully digested. 29 To further outline the
challenge that the Court must address in interpreting EU law, one
has to consider that any comparative law input must anyhow still
lead to the application of the rule that fits the aims or purposes of
the Union, because the use of comparative law as a means of gap
filling and interpretation of EU law is useful only insofar as it advances the purposes of the European legal order and fits coherently
into the system of EU law. 30 However, reference to the laws of
Member States remains indispensable in the search for a solution
that is fully in line with the objectives and basic principles of EU
law. This has been recognised by the Court over and over again,
from the very inception of its activity. The Algera case 31 is an early,
much cited illustration of this approach. In the Algera case, the Court
remarked that the rules of the Treaty did not cover the problem
raised by the litigation, namely the possibility of withdrawing an
administrative decision, but also found that the same problem was:
familiar in the case-law and learned writing of all the countries of the Community. . . . Unless the Court is to deny justice it is therefore obliged to solve the problem by reference
to the rules acknowledged by the legislation, the learned
writing and the case-law of the member countries. 32
The Court is not forced to a lowest common denominator when
proceeding in this way. As Advocate General Slynn remarked in a
later case with respect to the comparative examination of the various
national solutions: “Such a course is followed not to import national
Bussani, and the Ius Commune Casebooks for the Common Law of Europe,
started by Walter van Gerven and now directed by Dimitri Droshout, tackle as
well the same challenge.
29. For critical reflections on this, see the different remarks of P. Legrand,
Antivonbar, 1 J. COMP. L. 13 (2006) and H.-W. MICKLITZ, THE POLITICS OF
JUSTICE IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW (Cambridge U. Press 2018).
30. There is common agreement on this point, which is brilliantly highlighted
by S. Rodin, Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions, 64 AM. J.
COMP. L. 815 (2016).
31. Joined Cases 7/56, 3/57 to 7/57 Dineke Algera et al. v Common Assembly
of the European Coal and Steel Community [1957–58] ECR, English special edition, 00039.
32. Id. at ¶ 55.
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laws as such into Community law, but to use it as a means of discovering an unwritten principle of Community law.” 33 While the International Court of Justice is required by article 38(1)(c) of its statute to apply: “the general principles of law recognised by civilised
nations,” there is no general provision like this in the European Treaties. 34 Nonetheless, this has not stopped the Court from elaborating
general principles of EU law that are of great importance for the
evolution of EU law, 35 putting flesh on the bones of the EU’s legal
order to use the metaphor advanced by Advocate General Mazak
nearly ten years ago. 36 The principles in question often derive from
a comparative examination the laws of the Member States on certain
issues. The case law of the Court on this point has recognised on this
basis a variety of principles, e.g. the prohibition of unjust enrichment on the part of the Community,37 the admissibility of “default
interests” for sums due under EU law, 38 the recognition of clientlawyer privilege in proceedings opened by the Commission.39
33. Opinion of Advocate General Slynn delivered on Jan. 26, 1982, C-155/79
AM & S Europe Limited v Commission of the European Communities. Legal privilege [1982] ECR 01575, p. 1649 (emphasis in original).
34. The point is made by F.G. Jacobs, supra note 7, at 537. See Opinion of
Advocate General Tesauro delivered on Nov. 28, 1995, C-46/93 Brasserie du
pêcheur SA v Bundesrepublik Deutschland and The Queen v Secretary of State
for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and others [1996] ECR I-01029.
35. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW: EUROPEAN AND COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES OXFORD (S. Vogenauer & S. Weatherill eds., Hart Publ’g 2017);
T. Tridimas, The General Principles of Law: Who Needs Them?, 52 CAHIERS DE
DROIT EUROPÉEN 419 (2016); K. Lenaerts & J.A. Gutiérrez-Fons, The Constitutional Allocation of Powers and General Principles of EU Law, 47 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 1629 (2010).
36. Opinion of Advocate General Mazàk delivered on Feb. 15, 2007, C411/05 Félix Palacios de la Villa v Cortefiel Servicios SA [2007] ECR I-08531,
¶¶ 83–86. For the relevance of comparative law in this context, see G. Martinico,
Exploring the Platonic Heaven of Law: General Principles of EU Law from a
Comparative Perspective, 3 NORD. J. EUR. LAW 1 (2020).
37. C-47/07 Masdar (UK) Ltd v Commission of European Communities
[2008] ECR I-09761, ¶¶ 44–50.
38. For a summing up of the relevant law, see Opinion of Advocate General
Bot delivered on Sept. 4, 2014, Case C-336/13 P European Commission v IPK
International - World Tourism Marketing Consultants GmbH [2014]
EU:C:2014:2170, ¶¶ 62–67.
39. Case 155/79 AM & S Europe Limited v Commission of the European
Communities [1982] ECR 01575, ¶¶ 18–21. See C-550/07 P Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Akcros Chemicals Ltd v European Commission [2010] ECR I-08301,
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V. THE EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF EU LAW AND THE
COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT LAWS
So far, I have discussed how the comparative examination of
laws of the Member States play out in the interpretation and application of EU law by the Court. At the core of the European Union
lies the establishment of the internal market. This drives a multitude
of harmonizing efforts, targeting the laws of the Member States,
which stand in a dialectical relationship with the principle of mutual
recognition, first affirmed in the Cassis de Dijon case. 40 But comparisons among the laws of the Member States are not the only ones
that the Court develops within this framework. The Court draws
comparisons between EU law and U.S. law as well; they are important too, to understand what type of comparisons the ECJ develops in fulfilling its tasks.
The world we live in is a highly interconnected world. To cope
with previously unknown coordination problems, we need more, rather than less, comparative law expertise. 41 As far as EU law is concerned, this means an openness to comparisons involving the laws
of non-Member States as well, and first and foremost with the U.S.,
the other major trading block among capitalist economies. 42
A dispute now pending before the ECJ is a wonderful illustration
of the increasing demand for the coordination of regulatory regimes
at the international level and of how comparative law becomes relevant in this respect. The case concerns inter alia the validity of the
agreement between the EU and the U.S. known as “Privacy

¶¶ 40–51 (no common trend among Member States concerning the recognition of
legal privilege over correspondence for in-house lawyer).
40. Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein
[1979] ECR 00649.
41. See S. BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE
NEW GLOBAL REALITIES 4 (Knopf 2015): “judicial awareness can no longer stop
at the border.”
42. This was the intuition which led to the pioneering study of M.
CAPPELLETTI, M. SECCOMBE & J. H. WEILER, INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW
EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE (De Gruyter 1986).
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Shield.” 43 The agreement governs the safeguards to be provided in
the transfer of EU citizens’ personal data from the EU to the U.S.
Companies conducting business in Europe and North America need
to transfer data across the Atlantic, but such transfers are regulated
by EU law as well. The story behind this litigation begins in 2010,
when Mr. Maximilian Schrems, a law student from Austria aged 23,
went for his semester abroad at Santa Clara University in the Silicon
Valley. During his stay at that law school, Mr. Schrems participated
in a seminar where the guest speaker was Ed Palmieri, Facebook’s
privacy lawyer. Schrems related that he was shocked by the
speaker’s limited grasp of the severity of data protection laws in Europe. Once back at home in Austria, he launched a first lawsuit to
challenge the status quo. The litigation ended up at the ECJ. In 2015,
a first judgment was, thus, handed down by the ECJ in this matter.44
The judgment proclaimed that the so-called Safe Harbour agreement—the predecessor of the Privacy Shield agreement—was based
on an invalid decision of the Commission.45 The ECJ found that the
decision of the Commission on Safe Harbour agreement was invalid
because it failed to state, as required by EU law, that the U.S. ensures
an “adequate level of protection” of the fundamental rights and freedoms of EU citizens after their data was transferred to the U.S., as
required by the applicable EU legislation and fundamental rights
law. 46 The Court explained that governments may interfere with personal data “only in so far as is strictly necessary.” 47 Along the lines
43. Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of July 12, 2016
pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on
the adequacy of the protection provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, OJ 2016,
L 207, p. 1–112.
44. Case C-362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner
[2015] EU:C:2015:650.
45. The decision that was thus declared invalid was the following: Commission Decision 2000/520/EC of July 26, 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection
provided by the safe harbor privacy principles and related frequently asked questions issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce, OJ L 215, 25.8.2000, p. 7–47.
46. Id. at ¶¶ 96–97.
47. Case C-362/14, ¶ 92.
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already announced in Digital Rights Ireland, 48 it further held that:
“legislation permitting the public authorities to have access on a
generalised basis to the content of electronic communications must
be regarded as compromising the essence of the fundamental right
to respect for private life. . . .” 49
This means that surveillance operations conducted through bulk
access to data are not compatible with the European fundamental
rights regime. 50 Furthermore, EU law requires “effective judicial
protection” and access to legal remedies for privacy violations. The
ECJ found that the European Commission had failed to assess
whether the U.S. approach to data protection was satisfactory in this
respect too. 51 Both in Brussels and in Washington, the judgment was
a bombshell. 52 The EU Commission and the U.S. government were
sent back to the drawing board. They, thus, rushed to strike a new
agreement. However, the new agreement, known as Privacy Shield,
has already been hit by a fresh request for a preliminary ruling by
the ECJ. 53 Again, the question is whether the fundamental rights and
freedoms relating to personal data, guaranteed in Europe, are being
respected when personal data are transferred to the U.S. The Court
will also have to decide whether alternative approaches based on
“standard contractual clauses”—that is, contract templates that are
pre-approved by the European Commission for data transfers, 54 are
48. Joined Cases C‑293/12 and C‑594/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources et al. [2014]
EU:C:2014:238.
49. Case C-362/14, ¶ 94.
50. Id. at ¶¶ 92–93.
51. Id. at ¶ 95.
52. The U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Communications
and Technology (Committee on Energy and Commerce) hearing on “Examining
the EU Safe Harbor Decision and Impacts for Transatlantic Data Flows” held on
Nov. 3, 2015 gives an idea of the U.S. reactions to the ECJ ruling,
https://perma.cc/44CH-6G2P.
53. Case C-311/18 Facebook Ireland Limited and Schrems, case in progress.
54. Commission Decision 2010/87 of Feb. 5, 2010 on standard contractual
clauses for the transfer of personal data to processors established in third countries
under Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L
39/6, 12.2.2010, p. 5–18, as amended by Commission Implementing Decision
(EU) 2016/2297 of Dec. 16, 2016, OJ L 344, 17.12.2016, p. 100–101.
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adequate or not, a vital point for the firms that are currently using
this technique in day-to-day operations.
Advocate General Henrik Saugmandsgaard Øe’s opinion in this
case holds that the Commission’s decision on standard contractual
clauses is valid, provided that there are sufficiently sound mechanisms to ensure that transfers based on the standard contractual
clauses are suspended or prohibited where those clauses are
breached or impossible to honour. In his view, that is the case in so
far as there is an obligation—placed on the data controllers and,
where the latter fails to act, on the supervisory authorities—to suspend or prohibit a transfer when those clauses cannot be complied
with. With respect to the Privacy Shield decision, the Advocate General expressed criticism in the light of the right to respect for private
life and the right to an effective remedy, although he also held that
the dispute in the main proceedings does not require the Court to
rule on the validity of the privacy shield.
We will soon learn the outcome of the request for a preliminary
ruling in this case. What is already clear is that the litigation has
brought about an unprecedented wave of comparative law research
about privacy laws on the two sides of the Atlantic. If the ECJ finds
that the new agreement is inadequate, some form of harmonisation
between the EU and U.S. approach to privacy and data protection is
much more likely to occur in the future. 55
VI. THE TRANSATLANTIC DIMENSIONS OF THE COMPARATIVE
EXERCISE
In the Privacy Shield litigation, a comparison of laws is implicitly mandated by EU fundamental rights law and the relevant data
protection legislation. But the ECJ may go for outward looking comparisons concerning U.S. law, as opposed to inward looking comparisons concerning the laws of the Member States, for a variety of
55. C-311/18. On June 20, 2020, the Court handed down its decision, holding
that the privacy shield is indeed invalid.
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reasons. The Court may conduct these comparisons because of the
relative novelty of some issues coming up before the Court. However, the same issues may be not so new in a wider perspective.
Sometimes it is tempting to turn to the U.S. to elaborate solutions
for Europe, or at least to make informed decisions benefitting from
the experience and lessons learnt in the U.S., as it has happened in a
variety of fields, including, inter alia, antitrust, intellectual property
(and trademarks in particular), federal-state relations in connection
with the regulation of interstate commerce, and gender-based antidiscrimination law. 56 Once more, the precise numbers of the ECJ
cases that have carried out such a comparison for one of the reasons
mentioned above is difficult to establish. Here, I will only mention
two cases that have brought about important developments in EU
law and that are illustrative of this practice.
The first is Jenkins v. Kingsgate, 57 dating back to 1981. This ruling is the first to ban indirect discrimination based on sex in equal
pay cases under EU law. Jenkins was a woman employed as a parttime worker, to do the same work as her full-time colleagues, in a
small textile company based in England. Her hourly pay was 10 per
cent less than the pay of the full-time workforce. In her factory,
nearly all the part time workers were women, while nearly all the
full-time workers were men. The Advocate General’s opinion in
Jenkins relied explicitly on the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Griggs v. Duke Power 58 to establish a parallel between the condition
of African Americans in the U.S. and women in Europe, with respect
to indirect discrimination. The Advocate General knew, of course,
56. Three important studies have explored this theme; see P. Herzog, United
States Supreme Court Cases in the Court of Justice of the European Communities,
21 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 903 (1998); L. F. Peoples, The Use of Foreign Law by the Advocates General of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 35 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 219 (2007); L. F. Peoples, The Influence of Foreign Law Cited in the Opinions of Advocates General on Community
Law, 28 YEARBOOK OF EUR. L. 458 (2009).
57. Case C-96/80 J.P. Jenkins v Kingsgate Ltd. [1981] ECR 00911. See I.
Tourkochoriti, Jenkins v Kingsgate and the Migration of the US Disparate Impact
Doctrine in EU Law, in EU LAW STORIES, supra note 10, at 418.
58. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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that in the U.S. the disparate impact doctrine, first affirmed with respect to racial discrimination cases under the Civil Rights Act of
1964, was applied to fight sex discrimination in the workplace as
well:
As has been observed more than once, the Supreme Court of
the United States and this Court often find themselves confronted with similar problems. Although of course the provisions of the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 that
were in question in the Griggs case were worded differently
from Article 119 of the Treaty, their essential purpose was
the same, except in so far as the provision in question in the
Griggs case was about racial discrimination, not sex discrimination. Indeed in Dothard v. Rawlinson (1977) 433 US 321
the Supreme Court applied similar reasoning to sex discrimination. I draw considerable comfort from finding that my
conclusion accords with the conclusions of that court in
those cases. 59
An English barrister with a Harvard LL.M., Anthony Lester,
who had contributed to the elaboration of U.K. Race Relations Act
by managing to persuade the Labour Government to insert a reference to indirect discrimination in it, pleaded the Jenkins’s case before the ECJ. The Advocate General’s opinion reveals that this English barrister argued that the U.S. disparate impact doctrine announced by Chief Justice Burger in Griggs should have guided the
ECJ’s decision on pay discrimination as well. The argument, thus,
first advanced in the defendant’s brief is reflected in a couple of lines
of the ECJ judgment, though without any reference to U.S. civil
rights law. A pay differential between full and part-time workers is
not in itself prohibited under the Treaty: “unless it is in reality an
indirect way of reducing the pay of part-time workers on the ground
that that group of workers is composed exclusively or predominantly of women.” 60

59. Opinion of Advocate General Warner delivered on Jan. 28, 1981, Case
96/80.
60. Case C-96/80, ¶ 15.

22

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 13

The second case of an outward looking use of comparative law
between U.S. and EU Law is provided by the Ruiz Zambrano litigation. 61 Here, the ECJ concluded that denying a residence and work
permit in Belgium to a Colombian father would impermissibly interfere with the substance of the European citizenship of his Belgian-born children. There is no need to ponder the full details of the
case. Let us just note that it is also a landmark decision because the
right of the plaintiff is recognised with respect to a situation that is
purely internal to one of the Member States. And yet, despite this,
the case is brought under the umbrella of EU law. What deserves a
closer examination here is the opinion of Advocate’s General Sharpston. She explores the idea whether the question put to the Court
should be addressed purely on the basis of the protection of fundamental rights under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 62 Citing the U.S. Supreme Court, in Gitlow v. New
York, 63 Sharpston argues that a step in this direction would bring the
EU law approach in line with how the U.S doctrine of incorporation,
as first outlined:
[W]hen the US Supreme Court extended the reach of several
rights enshrined in the Constitution’s First Amendment to
individual states. The ‘incorporation’ case-law, based since
then on the ‘due process’ clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, does not require an inter-state movement nor legislative acts from Congress. According to the Supreme Court,
certain fundamental rights are so significant that they are
‘among the fundamental personal rights and liberties protected by the due process clause . . . from impairment by the
states. 64

61. C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi [2011]
ECR I-01177. On this case, see the instructive contribution by F. Strumia, Ruiz
Zambrano’s Quiet Revolution, in EU LAW STORIES, supra note 10, at 224.
62. Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered on Sept. 10, 2010,
Case C-34/09, ¶¶ 172–173 [hereinafter Opinion AG Sharpston, Case C-34/09].
63. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). R. Schütze, European Fundamental Rights and the Member States: From ‘Selective’ to ‘Total’ Incorporation?,
14 CAMBRIDGE YEARBOOK OF EUR. LEG. STUD. 337 (2012).
64. Opinion AG Sharpston, Case C-34/09, ¶ 172.
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The Advocate General thinks that when the relevant facts occurred in Zambrano no such doctrine was yet established. But Advocate Sharpston maintains that this change may come sooner rather
than later:
[T]he Court should not, in the present case, overtly anticipate
change. I do suggest, however, that (sooner rather than later)
the Court will have to choose between keeping pace with an
evolving situation or lagging behind legislative and political
developments that have already taken place. At some point,
the Court is likely to have to deal with a case – one suspects,
a reference from a national court – that requires it to confront
the question of whether the Union is not now on the cusp of
constitutional change (as the Court itself partially foresaw
when it delivered Opinion 2/94). Answering that question
can be put off for the moment, but probably not for all that
much longer. 65
The case that Advocate Sharpston foreshadowed has now come
to the Court, not just in one dispute, but in several ones, and in various proceedings, namely as a reference for a preliminary ruling, but
also in the context of infringement procedures.
For the first time in 2016, when dealing with the Portuguese
judges’ case, 66 the Court announced a common standard concerning
judicial independence. This standard is applicable to sanction violations of the right to an effective judicial remedy and to judicial independence by the Member States. The case concerned the salary
reduction measures applied to the judges in Portugal, as well as to
all other public employees in Portugal in response to the 2008 financial crisis. These measures were challenged under EU law, but the
Court upheld their validity. The Court held that the pay reduction
measures applied in Portugal did not undermine judicial independence, which is an essential component of the right to an effective
judicial protection, because these measures affected the entire public
sector.
65. Id. at ¶¶ 172–173, 177.
66. Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de
Contas [2018] EU:C:2018:117.
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Although this conclusion could be easily taken for granted in
that context, in its ruling the Court affirmed a general obligation for
Member States to guarantee and protect judicial independence,
which is an essential part of the principle of effective judicial protection of individual’s rights: “[A] court or tribunal’s independence
is essential, as confirmed by the second subparagraph of Article 47
of the Charter, which refers to the access to an ‘independent’ tribunal as one of the requirements linked to the fundamental right to an
effective remedy.” 67 According to the Court:
The principle of the effective judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law, referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, is a general principle of EU
law stemming from the constitutional traditions common to
the Member States, which has been enshrined in Articles 6
and 13 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, . . . and which is
now reaffirmed by Article 47 of the Charter. 68
This is why some commentators have considered this judgment
as a first step in the development of a European version of the incorporation doctrine announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Gitlow
v. New York, as foreshadowed by Advocate General Sharpston. 69
The Portuguese judges’ ruling was followed by other decisions
handed down by the Grand Chamber of the ECJ in 2019. In Commission v. Poland, 70 at issue were the measures taken by the Polish
government to lower the retirement age of judges. The question
raised was whether these measures violated the obligations flowing
from primary EU law to secure judicial independence and the right
to an effective judicial remedy. The precedent set in the Portuguese
67. Id. at ¶ 41.
68. Id. at ¶ 35.
69. L. Pech & S. Platon, Judicial Independence Under Threat: The Court of
Justice to the Rescue in the ASJP Case, 55 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1827 (2018).
According to the authors, the case “comes close to being the EU equivalent of the
US Supreme Court case of Gitlow as regards the principle of effective judicial
protection.”
70. Case C-619/18 European Commission v Republic of Poland [2019]
EU:C:2019:531.
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judges’ case already made clear that the traditional material criterion
that separated the respective spheres of EU and national law cannot
and do not govern questions of such fundamental importance for democracy and the rule of law as judicial independence. The claim of
the Polish (and Hungarian) government that the rules governing the
judiciary fall within the exclusive competence of the Member State
was flatly rejected by the ECJ. In Commission v. Poland, the ECJ
made the principle of effective judicial protection (including the
principle of judicial independence) subject to federal standards of
review—to use the language that would be used in the U.S. Therefore, to quote the words of the judgment in this case:
[A]lthough, as the Republic of Poland and Hungary point
out, the organisation of justice in the Member States falls
within the competence of those Member States, the fact remains that, when exercising that competence, the Member
States are required to comply with their obligations deriving
from EU law. 71
The ECJ ruling in this case, as in the previous case concerning
the Portuguese judges, held that effective judicial protection is a
general principle of EU law stemming from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. 72 The same holding has also
been affirmed in Commission v. Republic of Poland 73 and underlies
the judgment of the Court in the Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18
and C-625/18, A. K. and Others v Sąd Najwyższy 74 The latter of
these decisions makes clear that the principle of the primacy of EU
law requires the referring court to disapply national law and reserves
jurisdiction to a court that does not meet the requirements of judicial
independence. As such, the case would need to be heard and decided
by a court that meets the articulated requirements.

71. Id. at ¶ 52.
72. Id. at ¶ 49.
73. C-192/18 European Commission v Republic of Poland [2019]
EU:C:2019:924.
74. Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, A. K. and Others v Sąd
Najwyższy [2019] EU:C:2019:982.
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VII. EU LAW AND THE EXTRACONTRACTUAL LIABILITY OF THE
EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS
The reference to the common constitutional traditions of the
member states in the Commission v. Poland judgment brings me to
consider what I have until now postponed. There are provisions of
the Treaties that call, in rather explicit terms, for a comparative law
foundation of the applicable law. A first well-known example of this
kind, going back to the origins of the law of the European institutions, is the law applicable to the extracontractual liability of the EU.
A second example of more recent, but ever growing, importance is
provided by the reference to the notion of “constitutional traditions
common to the Member States.” 75 Together with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, these traditions provide
a grounding of fundamental rights as general principles of EU law,
as now proclaimed by article 6.3 TEU and article 52.4 of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
Already in the first version of the Treaty, dating back to 1957,
the extracontractual liability of the European institutions was established on the basis of the general principles common to the laws of
the Member States. In its present version, article 340 of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union provides that: “[T]he Union shall, in accordance with the general principles common to the
laws of the Member States, make good any damage caused by its
institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties.”
According to the same article, a similar provision now governs
the liability of the European Central Bank, which does not, however,
involve the liability of the Union; this is treated as an autonomous
institution in this respect as well. With the entry into force of the
75. O. Pollicino, Transfiguration and Actual Relevance of the Common Constitutional Traditions: Past, Present and Future, 18 GLOBAL JURIST 1 (2018); O.
Pollicino, Common Constitutional Traditions in the Age of the European Bill (s)
of Rights: Chronicle of a (Somewhat Prematurely) Death Foretold, in THE
FRAGMENTED LANDSCAPE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROTECTION IN
EUROPETHE ROLE OF JUDICIAL AND NON-JUDICIAL ACTORS 42, 49, 51–52 (Edward Elgar 2018) [hereinafter Common Constitutional Traditions].
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Charter of Fundamental Rights, the duty of the Union to make good
any damage caused to third parties has acquired a further dimension.
The Charter now establishes as a binding fundamental right of every
person: “to have the Union make good any damage caused . . . , in
accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the
Member States.” 76
The reference to the general principles common to the laws of
the Member States in these articles require the Court to conduct a
comparative examination of those laws, to establish what is actually
common to them, as far as their principles are concerned. Essential
concepts such as damage, loss, injury, negligence, causality, fault,
and so, on are still given different meanings in the Member States
so that to determine to what extent one can find commonalities
across the Member States is not a simple task. 77 This explains why
the jurisprudence of the Court on this matter has been examined
more than a few times in works dedicated to European private law.
Authors seek to answer the following question: “How does the Court
do it?” 78 In turn, these works have been cited by the Courtas
usual, the citations are mostly in the Advocates General’s opinions. 79 In terms of effectiveness, the jurisprudence of the Court on
this matter attracts some critical remarks because claims brought
against European institutions on this basis have had a very low rate
of success. A recent study prepared for the European Parliament
highlights this outcome.80 From the time that the Community was
76. Article 41.3 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
77. See K. Gutman, The Evolution of the Action for Damages Against the
European Union and its Place in the System of Judicial Protection, 48 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 695, 700 (2011); Gutman notes that “the case law on the Union’s
non-contractual liability is littered with concepts – e.g. damage, loss, injury,
causal link, fault, negligence, etc. – that are interpreted differently in the Member
States.”
78. TORT LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (H. Koziol & R. Schulze eds.,
Springer 2008).
79. See Advocate General Mengozzi delivered on Jan. 11, 2007, C-282/05 P
Holcim (Deutschland) AG v Commission of the European Communities [2007]
ECR I-02941, ¶¶ 58, 115.
80. R. Mańko, European Parliamentary Research Service, Action for Damages Against the EU (Dec. 2018), available at https://perma.cc/M4YX-BKLG.
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founded up to the year 2000, only twenty actions for damages were
successful. The number is similar between 2000 and 2014: Nineteen
plaintiffs have won against European institutions. It is not quite
“mission impossible” but these are very low numbers indeed. The
average success rate is a mere 8%. More recent data do not change
this picture. The case law of the Court thus makes “only a modest
contribution to breaking down the immunities of public bodies.”81
This is somewhat ironic, considering the importance that the Court
attributes to the principle of effective judicial protection.
VIII. THE “CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITIONS COMMON TO THE
MEMBER STATES” AS AN INVITATION TO COMPARATIVE LAW
As mentioned above, article 6.3 TEU establishes fundamental
rights as general principles of the Union’s law: “as guaranteed by
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional
traditions common to the Member States . . .” Article 52.4 of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights further provides that: “In so far as
this Charter recognises fundamental rights as they result from the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, those rights
shall be interpreted in harmony with those traditions.” 82 These are
once more norms that explicitly require a determination of what is
common among the Member States. Obviously, this is more than
invitation to adopt a comparative stance to ascertain the general
principles of European law in the area of fundamental rights.
Those who are familiar with the evolution of European law will
quickly draw attention to the absence of similar provisions from the
text of the original Treaties. They are right, of course. A first version
81. C. VAN DAM, EUROPEAN TORT LAW 533 (Oxford U. Press 2013).
82. There is a reference to the same notion in the Preamble of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union:
This Charter reaffirms, with due regard for the powers and tasks of the
Union and for the principle of subsidiarity, the rights as they result, in
particular, from the constitutional traditions and international obligations
common to the Member States, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. . . .
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of this provision was incorporated in the Treaties only after the European Court of Justice recognized the necessity of containing the
potentially disruptive dynamics originating in the inevitable collisions between the norms of national constitutions of Members States
and European law. 83 The way out of the problem was to proclaim
that the validity of EU law could not be challenged on the basis of
the constitutions of Member States. And yet, at the same time, to
elaborate a doctrine of EU fundamental rights that draws from the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States. 84 As the
Court first held in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft 85:
Respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the
general principles of law protected by the Court of Justice.
The protection of such rights, whilst inspired by the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, must be
ensured within the framework of the structure and objectives
of the Community.
The Court, thus, asserted the autonomy and the independence of
the Community legal order vis-à-vis the Member States, but it also
recognized that this order presents a constitutional dimension “inspired”this was the original expressionby the constitutional traditions common to the laws of the Member States. This formula has
been subsequently refined and now it is featured in over one hundred
decisions rendered by the ECJ according to research conducted by
Riccardo de Caria and myself in 2017. 86 The constitutional traditions of the Member States are not stand-alone sources of law in this
framework. Under article 4.2 TEU, the European Union has
83. S. Cassese, The “Constitutional Traditions Common to the Member
States” of the European Union, 4 RIV. TRIM. DIR. PUB. 939 (2017).
84. B. Davies, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft and the Miscalculation at
the Inception of the ECJ’s Human Rights Jurisprudence, in EU LAW STORIES,
supra note 10, at 155.
85. Case 11-70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und
Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 01125, ¶ 14.
86. M. Graziadei & R. De Caria, The “Constitutional Traditions Common to
the Member States” in the Case-law of the European Court of Justice: Judicial
Dialogue at its Finest, 4 RIV. TRIM. DIR. PUB. 949 (2017). Meanwhile, the number
of decisions featuring a reference to the notion has grown. For a study on the raise
and the impact of this notion, see Cassese, supra note 83.
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undertaken the obligation to respect the constitutional identity of the
Member States, 87 which is also a means to diffuse the tensions that
can and do arise in the adjudication of EU law. 88 At the national
level, a reference to the notion of “constitutional identity” should
also reflect “a palpable commitment to the European project” by the
national constituency. 89 Nonetheless, a tendency to take a confrontational approach to this is matter is emerging, not only in some eastern countries like Hungary, but also at the centre of Europe, as the
controversial judgment of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht on
the expanded asset purchase program of the European Central Bank
shows. 90
Clearly, an assessment of what is common among the Member
States, as far as the respective constitutional traditions are concerned, should involve a serious comparative effort by the Court, to
give substance to the bottom up approach represented by this reference to the laws of the Member States. The European Charter of
Fundamental Rights and the European Convention of Human Rights
show what has been achieved so far and what is already common to
the Member States in the field of fundamental freedoms and rights.
But we should not underestimate the power of unwritten law represented by the general principles of EU law, built upon the
87. Article 4.2 TEU:
The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental
structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local
self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions, including
ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order
and safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.
88. CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY IN A EUROPE OF MULTILEVEL
CONSTITUTIONALISM (C. Calliess & G. van der Schyff eds., Cambridge U. Press
2019).
89. T. Drinóczi, Constitutional Identity in Europe: The Identity of the Constitution. A Regional Approach, 21 German Law Journal 105, 129 (2020).
90. See BVerfG, 2 BvR 859/15, May 5, 2020. The original version of the
judgment goes as far as to charge Mario Draghi, former head of the Bank of Italy,
of partiality towards his country in launching the OTM programme. This ugly
remark is, however, omitted in the English version of the judgment provided by
the Court itself. As the insightful study by Drinóczi shows, the approach of constitutional courts on this matter is far from uniform in Europe.
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foundations provided by the constitutional traditions of the Member
States. They are an immense normative reservoir to be tapped, 91 especially when EU law falls short of providing a specific rule, or textual reference. Reference to those traditions is also a reminder of the
fact that EU law can seldom afford the luxury of starting from
scratch.

91. Pollicino, Common Constitutional Traditions, supra note 75, at 42, 71.

